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I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the Supreme Court decided Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,' courts and scholars debated the wisdom and con-
stitutionality of land use exactions and impact fees-government-im-
posed charges on the right to develop land.2 Many municipalities have
long required developers to finance infrastructure improvements. s Fis-
cally drained municipalities, particularly big cities, had begun to use, or
to consider using, exactions or their close cousins, "linkage" programs,
as a means to finance a wider variety of government services.4
The controversy these fees have generated reflects more general
concerns about financing local government. Municipalities and their de-
fenders justify exactions and impact fees as necessary to assure that
new development pays its own way rather than imposing external costs
on existing residents.5 Others, however, express concern that uncon-
strained municipalities might use exactions to "extort" money from
outsiders inadequately represented in municipal political
processes-principally landowners and prospective homebuyers 6
1. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. Early commentary on exactions includes Ira Michael Heyman and Thomas K. Gilhool,
The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 Yale L. J. 1119 (1964), and John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitu-
tionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 Cornell L. Q. 871
(1967). These articles responded to early cases addressing the constitutionality of exactions, in-
cluding Pioneer Trust & Says. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799
(1961), and Gulest Associates v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
With the expanding use of exactions to fund governmental activities, the subject received in-
creasing attention in the literature. Indeed, just months before the Nollan case was decided, Law
and Contemporary Problems devoted a symposium issue to the subject. See Richard F. Babcock,
spec. ed., Exactions: A Controversial New Source for Municipal Funds, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Winter 1987, at 1.
3. Municipalities first required developers to build roads and other infrastructure improve-
ments as a condition for subdivision approval, and then required dedication of lands for park and
other public purposes. From these requirements grew the practice of making developers pay cash
in lieu of land dedications-especially where an outright dedication of land would not be suffi-
ciently useful to the public. See generally R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Re-
quirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land
Development Exactions, Law & Contemp. Probs., 5, 7-19 (Winter 1987).
4. For a discussion of the "linkage" programs adopted in Boston and San Francisco, both of
which linked the right to construct new commercial space to the construction and financing of new
housing, see generally Robert Collin and Michael Lytton, Linkage: An Evaluation and Explora-
tion, 21 Urban Law. 413, 414, 417-21 (1990). For criticism of these programs as impermissible
redistributive programs, see Comment, Mitigating Price Effects with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78
Cal. L. Rev. 721 (1990).
5. See, for example, Steven B. Schwanke, Local Governments and Impact Fees: Public
Need, Property Rights, and Judicial Standards, 4 J. Land Use & Envir. L. 215, 217-23, 245-47
(1989).
6. See, for example, J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12
(1981) (analogizing exactions to extortion).
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The Court's decision in Nollan intensified the debate over exac-
tions and impact fees.7 The Court held that a government may not con-
dition approval of a permit on a landowner's sacrifice of an interest
unrelated to the government's reasons for requiring the permit.8 The
Court thus imposed what appear to be serious constitutional limits on
municipal power to use exactions: The municipality can exact money
from a developer only if it can demonstrate that its exaction is related
to the harms caused by the developer's project.
A number of scholars have sought to explain, or to justify, the Nol-
lan Court's apparent hostility to exactions.9 In the most recent, and
perhaps most significant, contribution to the debate over exactions,
Professor Vicki Been suggests that the Court and the defenders of Nol-
lan have ignored an important constraint on municipal power to exact
fees from developers: market forces.' 0 Professor Been's thesis is that be-
cause developers can choose from among a variety of municipalities,
competition among municipalities restricts the power of each munici-
pality to "extort" money from developers." Professor Been acknowl-
edges that the Nollan opinion responds to two dangers posed by land
use exactions-unfair redistribution of wealth and inefficient deterrence
of socially beneficial development.'2 She argues, however, that competi-
tive pressures protect against both of these dangers.' 3 Whenever a mu-
nicipality sets its exaction price too high, developers will simply look
elsewhere.1 4
Professor Been notes that if market forces adequately constrain the
7. See Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1731
(1988); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Per-
spective, 20 Urban Law. 515 (1988); Schwanke, 4 J. Land Use & Envir. L. 215 (cited in note 5);
Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 992 (1989).
The Nollan case also spawned a set of articles discussing the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine more generally. See Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 62-63 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1988).
8. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating that "[i]n
short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion' ").
9. See Epstein, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 62-63 (cited in note 7), Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at
1463-64 (cited in note 7), Sterk, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1742-51 (cited in note 7).
10. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (1991).
11. Id. at 478, 509-545.
12. Id. at 504 (discussing overcharging and overregulation as principal dangers posed by ex-
actions). Professor Been also notes that exactions pose a threat of underregulation, but recognizes
that the Nollan doctrine does not serve to protect against underregulation and the concomitant
threat of favoritism.
13. See id. at 511.
14. Id. at 514-28.
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conduct of municipalities, the case for imposing legal con-
straints-particularly as a matter of constitutional law-is a weak one.
15
Having made her point forcefully and eloquently, Professor Been then
challenges those who would impose constraints on municipal power to
explain why market forces are inadequate to eliminate the potential for
municipal abuse of the exaction process.'
6
This article takes up Professor Been's challenge. My thesis is three-
fold. First, municipalities do not inevitably compete for residents; for
many communities, exclusion, not competition, is a principal land use
objective. Second, even when municipalities do compete, each munici-
pality has the capacity to extract rents from landowners-and to redis-
tribute the rents to other constituents-as long as land has economic
value. For those concerned about the evils of rent-seeking, then, exac-
tions remain problematic even if competition among municipalities does
not result in inefficient allocation of land. Third, the uniqueness of
many municipalities, particularly central cities, gives them monopoly
power on developers. As a result, these municipalities are in a position
to charge developers more than the marginal costs imposed by develop-
ment and thus to create misallocation of land.
II. Do MUNICIPALITIES COMPETE FOR RESIDENTS?
Professor Been theorizes that if municipalities must compete for
new residents and businesses, competition will restrain municipal abil-
ity to collect exactions on new development. But why should municipal-
ities compete for new residents and businesses? The proliferation of
novel land use controls over the past three decades suggests that, for
many municipalities, the goal is to avoid new residents, not to attract
them.' 7 Indeed, Nollan is unlikely to impede significantly municipalities
bent on closing their doors to all but wealthy residents and clean indus-
try."'8 Nollan does, however, highlight an important truth: Municipal of-
ficials, because they are ultimately accountable to their own
constituents, often have little incentive to consider the impact of their
decisions on outsiders. By focusing on competition as a constraint on
municipal behavior, Professor Been's article might lead casual read-
ers-or those seeking to justify a laissez faire attitude towards exclu-
sionary practices-to believe that a modern-day "invisible hand" will
unwittingly transform self-interested municipal officials into agents for
15. Id. at 543-45.
16. Id. at 545.
17. Indeed, Professor Been recognizes that exactions can be a tool for those seeking to ex-
clude undesirable residents. Id. at 483.
18. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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the common good. This Section of this Article is designed to set the
record straight. Whatever other advantages competition has, competi-
tion will not induce municipal officials to admit new residents or busi-
nesses who consume more in services than they contribute in taxes.
This Section first explores the theoretical basis for assuming that
municipalities compete for new development. It then shows that in
practice, municipalities have often sought to exclude rather than to
compete. Finally, this Section reveals how municipalities might use ex-
action policy as a weapon for pursuing an exclusionary strategy."
A. The Tiebout Hypothesis and the Failures of Competition
Professor Been's argument relies heavily on a controversial but in-
fluential theory developed in a 1957 article by Charles Tiebout.2 ° Tie-
bout argued that competition among municipalities would regulate the
municipal provision of public goods because potential residents would
"shop" among municipalities to find one that provided the mix of pub-
lic goods best suited to their desires.21 Professor Been builds on Tie-
19. My focus is on municipal power to use exactions for exclusionary purposes, not on how
actual municipalities will use that power. Much of the economic literature, not surprisingly, treats
the municipality as if it were a single rational economic actor, maximizing the aggregate welfare of
existing community residents. For instance, Tiebout assumed that "communities below the opti-
mum size seek to attract new residents to lower average costs. Those above optimum size do just
the opposite." Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416,
419 (1956). See also Dennis Epple and Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition among
Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 1197 (1981) (assuming a profit-maxi-
mizing local government); Michelle J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Areas
38-56 in Edwin S. Mills and Wallace E. Oates, eds., Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls (Lexing-
ton Books, 1975) (discussing municipal incentives to engage in fiscal-squeeze zoning); Truman F.
Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 Econometrica 713, 719
(1981) (characterizing the assumption that local governments maximize profits as "bizarre," but
nevertheless proceeding to analyze as if governments maximized profits).
The model of a municipality as a rational economic actor, however, is suspect. The public
officials who make municipal decisions are politicians, not automatons. Even if some relentlessly
seek to maximize aggregate community wealth, many will not. A model of municipal behavior that
treats a municipality as a single entity acting in its own self-interest fails to capture the diversity
of municipal politics and the variation in constituent interests. For more extensive discussion of
the prevailing motivations of municipal officials in the land use context, see Robert C. Ellickson,
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L. J. 385, 404-10 (1977).
See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Gov-
ernment in George R. Zodrow, ed., Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model After
Twenty-five Years 75 (Academic, 1983) (stating that "[m]uch empirical work in this area has too
uncritically accepted median voter models or monopoly models which assume the governments
maximize 'economic welfare' "); Julius Margolis, Public Policies for Private Profits: Urban Govern-
ment, in Harold M. Hochman and George E. Peterson, eds., Redistribution Through Public Choice
289, 317 (Columbia, 1974) (noting the difficulties facing urban officials whose revenue comes from
non-resident businesses, but whose voters are drawn from the poor).
20. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
21. Id. at 418.
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bout's theory and asks, in effect, why not assume that competition
among municipalities regulates exactions just as competition regulates
provision of public goods?
Tiebout addressed a problem of enduring importance: How can
governments meet constitutent desires about provision of public goods?
A pure public good is one which is available either to all residents or to
none and one which costs no more to provide for all residents than for
one.2 Army protection is an example of a pure public good. Once the
army is established, all residents benefit from the resulting protection
against attack, protection that costs no more to provide for a million
residents than for a thousand.23
How can a government decide which public goods to provide? Be-
cause public goods, if they are provided at all, must be made available
even to those who do not pay for them, the market cannot serve as a
mechanism for measuring constituent preferences. As a result, influen-
tial economists had concluded that it was always impossible to deter-
mine whether a government was providing an efficient level of public
goods-the level that reflected the desire of constituents.24 Tiebout,
however, countered that even if constituents within a municipality can-
not pick and choose from among the public goods they purchase, consti-
tutents dissatisfied with the mix offered by the municipality can choose
to move.2 5 If enough different municipalities coexist within the same
geographical area, competition among them should shape the mix of
public goods provided by each municipality.
Because pure public goods cost no more to produce for an infinite
number of residents than for a single resident, a municipality concerned
only about minimizing the per-resident cost of public goods would al-
ways compete for more residents. But the economies of scale inherent
in provision of pure public goods would ultimately lead to natural mo-
nopoly, with a single municipality rather than many competing ones. 26
When a municipality can provide services for additional residents
only at additional cost-as is the case for all goods except pure public
22. One introductory economics text defines a public good as "[a] good whose benefits can be
shared by many without loss to any individual, and from whose benefits it is not easy to exclude
people." Kelvin Lancaster, Modern Economics 730 (Rand McNally, 1973).
23. A lighthouse is, perhaps, the classic example of a pure public good. It is impossible to
exclude anyone from the services of a lighthouse once the lighthouse is established, and use of the
lighthouse by one ship does not decrease the services available to other ships. See id. at 220-21.
24. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. & Statis-
tics 387 (1954); Richard A. Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q.
J. Econ. 213 (1939).
25. Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ. at 418 (cited in note 19).
26. For a more thorough explanation for why natural monopoly results when costs per unit of
production decline over the entire range of outputs, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 221
(MacMillan, 3rd ed. 1966).
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goods-the nature of intermunicipal competition changes. Instead of
competing to attract all new residents, some municipalities will compete
to avoid all new residents, while others will compete to attract only "de-
sirable" new residents. Most services provided by local governments do
not qualify as pure public goods.17 Parks, roads, and water systems be-
come congested with increased population. School costs increase with
additional students even if schools are not filled to capacity. With addi-
tional residents comes the potential for additional crime, requiring
more police protection.
Tiebout recognized these realities in his assumption that "[f]or
every pattern of community services . . . there is an optimal commu-
nity size."'28 For Tiebout, the optimum would be "defined in terms of
the number of residents for which this bundle of services can be pro-
duced at the lowest average cost."2 9 Thus, Tiebout explicitly recognized
that some communities could be too big and would be better off re-
stricting new residents, or shedding old ones, rather than competing for
new entrants. ° Hence, Tiebout assumed that communities larger than
the optimum size do not, and should not, from an efficiency standpoint,
compete for more residents.-1
But Tiebout's hypothesis does not address differences in wealth
among potential residents. Even municipalities smaller than the opti-
mum size will not compete for certain potential residents, namely those
unwilling or unable to cover the marginal cost of the public services
they consume. If municipal governments furnished only pure public
goods, municipalities would welcome even those residents because, by
definition, it would cost nothing to make the public goods available to a
larger number of people. Hence, so long as newcomers could contribute
any amount, however small, to the public treasury, existing residents
27. See Edwin S. Mills and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and
Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in Mills and Oates, Fiscal Zoning
and Land Use Controls at 3 (cited in note 19) (noting that "Tiebout's local public services are not
pure Samuelsonian public goods"). Mills and Oates also wrote that:
[T]he defining characteristic of a pure public good is that no additional inputs are required to
extend the existing per capita consumption to additional citizens. The marginal cost of pro-
viding a given per capita output to additional citizens is thus zero for a pure public good,
neither a realistic description of most services provided by local, or other, governments nor
what Tiebout had in mind.
Id. See also Eitan Berglas, Quantities, Qualities and Multiple Public Services in the Tiebout
Model, 25 J. Pub. Econ. 299, 299-300 (1984).
28. Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ. at 419 (cited in note 19).
29. Id.
;30. Tiebout hypothesized a community with a defined stretch of beach and demonstrated
how including too many people in a community with limited beach area would be nonoptimal. Id.
at 419.
31. Id. at 419-20.
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would benefit from their entry. As we have seen, however, Tiebout rec-
ognized that many municipal services are not pure public goods. When
the municipality can provide public services to additional residents only
at additional cost, existing residents will only be willing to accept new
entrants who can contribute more than the marginal cost of providing
them with services. Some new residents will fail that test, even if the
municipality is smaller than Tiebout's optimum size (that is, even if the
average per-resident cost of providing public services is declining with
each additional resident).
Thus, no municipality has an incentive to compete for poor resi-
dents. Even if they consumed no more public services than wealthier
residents, poor residents might be unable to cover the marginal cost
associated with providing their own public services. Additionally, on the
whole, the poor are likely to consume more public services than the
wealthy. Poverty may breed crime. And the children of poor and uned-
ucated parents may require more intensive educational attention than
other children. An influx of poor residents, therefore, could significantly
increase the per-resident cost of public services.3 2 No municipality has a
financial interest in competing for development that will generate addi-
tional costs without generating the revenue to cover those costs. 33
Hence, municipalities might compete only for the most desirable devel-
opment such as homes for the wealthy and industry that brings in reve-
nue without consuming municipal resources.34
32. See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AEA Papers & Proc.
93, 95-97 (1981), questioning the soundness of Tiebout's assumption that the provision of public
services is subject to an ordinary U-shaped cost curve. Oates argues that the characteristics of the
individuals who comprise the community-not just the number of individuals-are significant in
determining the cost of providing public services. He notes, for instance, that the characteristics of
students and their families often explains achievement levels in local schools, and that "population
characteristics are typically the major explanatory variables in equations seeking to explain crime
rates." Id. at 96.
33. One might, therefore, conclude that exclusion of the poor is efficient. But the poor must
live somewhere, and as long as society remains committed to providing them with public services,
residents of wealthier communities will pay for those services somehow, perhaps through higher
federal and state taxes designed to subsidize municipalities with insufficient tax bases to provide
for their own public services. If richer municipalities cannot escape paying for the public service
needs of poorer residents, integrating the poor into wealthier communities may prove more effi-
cient than a system of exclusion accompanied by higher state or federal taxes. Yet, no individual
municipality, acting alone, has any incentive to pursue a policy of economic integration. Indeed,
much of the criticism of the Tiebout model emphasizes the likelihood that Tiebout-style competi-
tion will lead to ultimately undesirable exclusion of the poor from wealthier municipalities. See, for
example, Gary J. Miller, Cities by Contract 132-40 (MIT, 1981) (noting that Tiebout-style compe-
tition would lead high-income persons to congregate together, a result that might be "efficient,"
but only because low-income persons have no chips with which to bargain); W. Norton Grubb, The
Dynamic Implications of the Tiebout Model: The Changing Composition of Boston Communities,
1960-1970, 10 Pub. Finance Q. 17 (1982).
34. On one level, this sort of exclusionary competition is not inefficient. If a municipality
[Vol. 45:831
LAND USE EXACTIONS
B. Evidence: Growth Controls and Exclusionary Zoning
The history of land use controls supports the theory that munici-
palities often seek to avoid rather than attract new residents, especially
if those potential residents are less socioeconomically desirable than
current residents. New Jersey's landmark case, Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,s5 illustrates the point.
Mount Laurel Township's 1964 zoning ordinance allocated 29.2 percent
of the township's land area to industrial use. On these 4,121
acres-more than 40 times the land area actually occupied for indus-
trial purposes at the time that Mount Laurel was tried-no residential
development was permitted. 6 The ordinance zoned virtually all of the
township's remaining land for single-family homes.3 7 The largest single
residential district, comprising more than half of the municipality's
land area, permitted only homes built on half-acre lots. 8 The ordinance
did not provide for multiple-family building anywhere within Mt. Lau-
rel although a planned unit development (PUD) enactment, repealed by
the time Mount Laurel was decided, had resulted in approval of a sub-
stantial number of rental apartment units and attached townhouses.3 9
Even these units, however, were designed to attract highly educated
and trained residents and to limit the number of school-aged children
residing there.40 Indeed, the municipality explicitly required that the
developer pay tuition costs in the event that the number of children in
these projects exceeded 0.3 per multifamily unit.41
In defending its ordinance, the township argued that these provi-
sions, which would clearly operate to exclude people of moderate
means, were justified as a device to protect the municipal tax rate.42
exacts from potential residents a charge equal to the marginal cost imposed on the municipality by
those residents, the municipality's exaction policy will force potential residents to internalize the
externalities their entry would otherwise impose on existing residents.
Whether this exclusion of residents unwilling to pay is efficient more globally, however, is less
clear. Some potential residents will not be willing or able to pay for the costs they impose on any
community. Each community, therefore, would be better off excluding these persons. But what is
efficient for each community might not be efficient for the state as a whole: There must be some-
place within the state in which these persons would impose relatively fewer external costs than if
they located in other communities. From this more global perspective, it might be efficient for
persons to locate in a particular community even if the person would impose negative externalities
on the community.
35. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
36. 336 A.2d at 719.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 719-20.
39. Id. at 720-21.
40. Indeed, the resolutions approving the project included language reassuring residents
about the educated population base the projects would attract. Id. at 721.
41. Id. at 721-22.
42. Id. at 730-31.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court held that this justification was inade-
quate, and that the state constitution required each municipality to
provide its fair share of housing for low and moderate income persons. 3
Although the Mount Laurel decision was revolutionary in legal circles,
it hardly revolutionized housing production in New Jersey. Indeed,
eight years after the original Mount Laurel decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Mount Laurel 1I, acknowledged widespread non-
compliance with the original decision and lamented "Mount Laurel's
determination to exclude the poor. '44
Communities in other states have proven equally determined to ex-
clude the poor, as the (often unsuccessful) legal challenges to exclusion-
ary zoning have demonstrated. 5 In the quest to avoid new residents,
municipalities have not limited themselves to large lot zoning and other
traditional techniques. The City of Petaluma, 40 miles north of San
Francisco, imposed a limitation on the number of development-unit
permits it would issue each year. The Ninth Circuit sustained the
Petaluma plan against constitutional challenge.46 The Town of Ramapo,
in Rockland County at the edge of the New York metropolitan area,
enacted a system prohibiting development of land until the developer's
parcel could accumulate enough "points" to qualify for a permit.
Points were allocated according to a formula that emphasized accessi-
bility to various municipal services. For some landowners, development
might not be permitted until completion of the town's capital
plan-eighteen years after enactment of the point system. 48 The New
York Court of Appeals, while condemning "community efforts at immu-
nization or exclusion," sustained the Ramapo plan as a "temporary" re-
striction on development.49 Like exclusionary zoning ordinances, these
quota and phasing plans have proven to be effective methods for ex-
cluding unwanted new residents. More important for present purposes,
they illustrate municipal attitudes toward new residential development
that are entirely inconsistent with the notion that municipalities invari-
ably compete for residential development.
43. Id. at 732.
44. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456
A.2d 390, 410 (1983).
45. See, for example, Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 517
N.Y.S.2d 924, 511 N.E.2d 67 (1987); Kurzius, Inc., v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51
N.Y.2d 338, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 414 N.E.2d 680 (1980); Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 509 Pa.
413, 502 A.2d 585 (1985); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977);
Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
46. Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285
N.E.2d 291 (1972).
48. 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
49. Id. at 152-53.
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Of course, municipalities often do compete for some forms of devel-
opment, particularly industrial and commercial development likely to
bring jobs to the area. 0 A municipality is hardly likely to impose a sub-
stantial exaction on a potential employer the municipality wants to at-
tract. Competition, then, may sometimes constrain municipal ability to
impose exactions." But the basic point-illustrated by the exclusionary
zoning and growth control cases-is that most municipal services are
not pure public goods. Hence, municipalities can lower the per-resident
cost of public services only if the new residents can pay an amount
equal to or greater than the marginal cost of providing additional ser-
vices. Because many potential residents will be unable to make such a
contribution, municipalities will not compete for those residents.
C. Exactions and Exclusion
Municipalities shun some forms of development because they cre-
ate more costs than benefits. But suppose the developer compensates
municipal residents for the external costs generated by the develop-
ment. Municipalities might then be willing to compete for development
that otherwise would appear undesirable. Exactions and impact fees, by
compensating residents for external costs, may induce municipalities to
compete for development they otherwise would seek to avoid.52
Suppose, for instance, a new residential development would require
improvements to the municipal sewer system, expansion of existing
schools, and additional police and fire protection. Suppose further that
the development would not generate enough in ordinary tax revenues to
cover these additional costs. If exactions were forbidden, the municipal-
ity would have two choices. It could either approve the project and
force existing residents to bear the additional costs, or it could reject
the project. If, however, municipal officials were granted authority to
impose an exaction or impact fee on the developer, the municipality
could approve the project without forcing existing residents to bear the
costs generated. The municipality could set an exaction price high
enough to compensate residents for present and future costs generated
50. For various analyses of state and municipal competition for jobs and industry, see Gary
P. Green and Arnold Fleischman, Analyzing Local Strategies for Promoting Economic Develop-
ment, 17 Policy Stud. J. 557 (1989); Robert Guskind, The Giveaway Game Continues, Planning, 4
(February 1990); Dennis 0. Grady, State Economic Development Incentives: Why Do States Com-
pete?, 19 State & Local Gov't Rev. 86 (1987).
51. Even if the municipality were to impose an exaction on the potential employer's pro-
posed use of land, the employer would be unlikely to bear the cost of the exaction unless the
exaction were greater than the difference in value between land used for this purpose and land
used for other purposes. See part II.A.
52. See generally William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property
Rights Analysis, Law & Contemp. Probs., 101, 104-06 (Winter 1987).
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by the development. Competition with other municipalities would place
an upper limit on the exaction price the municipality could collect.5"
Suppose, however, that municipal exaction policy is designed not to
generate municipal revenue, but to deter unwanted development. For
example, in Mount Laurel the township had required developers of
multiple family housing to provide central air conditioning in all apart-
ments.54 A central air conditioning requirement, like other requirements
that developers provide amenities, does not directly augment the mu-
nicipal treasury, but it does increase the price of housing, making it less
likely that "undesirable" lower-income residents will move into the
community. Moreover, a municipality could impose an exaction, osten-
sibly to generate municipal revenue, but in reality aimed at discourag-
ing the development subject to the exaction. Does a regime which fails
to limit municipal use of exactions enable municipalities to exclude un-
wanted development that the municipality otherwise would be required
to permit?
If state law permits municipalities to pursue exclusionary land use
policies directly-through large lot zoning or various forms of growth
control-exactions do not expand municipal opportunity to exclude
"undesirable" development. No matter how high the exaction de-
manded by the municipality, the exaction is no more likely to deter
development than an ordinance that absolutely prohibits the unwanted
development. The situation is different, however, if the state, either by
statute or judicial decision, has imposed limits on exclusion.55
To avoid enacting prohibitions on large lot zoning or development
moratoria, a municipality might zone land for apartments or some other
intensive use, but then institute an exaction or impact fee policy
designed to discourage the unwanted development. Whether the fee
would have the desired effect depends on the economics of the situa-
tion: If intensive development were far more profitable than alternative
uses of the land, even a relatively stiff exaction would fail to deter a
developer, but if the developer could reap nearly equal profits by sub-
53. Requiring developers to provide amenities or public facilities generally brings one other
efficiency advantage: the developer, unconstrained by municipal bureaucracy or by arcane bidding
and contracting rules, may be able to complete the facilities in less time and at lower cost than any
government entity. See, for example, Alan Finder, New York Hopes to Learn from Rink Trump
Fixed, N.Y. Times, at B1, col. 4. (Nov. 21, 1986) (detailing obstacles that prevent government from
operating as efficiently as a private developer in completing a municipal skating rink).
54. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, 722 (1975).
55. Although a number of states have enacted statutes purporting to control exclusionary
zoning, those statutes have often proven ineffective. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 69-71 (1990). To the extent that
state controls on exclusionary zoning prove ineffective, municipalities need not resort to exactions
to pursue exclusionary policies.
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stituting a use not subject to an exaction, the exaction might Well have
the deterrent effect intended by municipal officials."
Of course, a legislature or court that has restricted exclusionary
zoning practices might also scrutinize a municipality's exaction policy
to prevent any exclusionary effect. The New Jersey courts would cer-
tainly do so. " It is not clear, however, that other courts would follow
suit. First, in states that have acted to control exclusionary zoning, the
controls are generally statutory, and the statutes, while requiring mu-
nicipalities to permit low-income housing, often say nothing explicit
about exactions.58 Moreover, most courts have traditionally sustained
exactions and impact fees when municipalities have demonstrated a
substantial relationship between the fees imposed and the actual costs
generated by the new development. 9 And even if a particular munici-
pality imposes an exaction that exceeds those costs, courts may be un-
willing to scrutinize the numbers very closely. In other words, a
determined municipality might well be able to use a carefully designed
exaction policy to avoid legislative or judicial restraints on exclusionary
zoning. 0
Competition, as we have seen,6 would not inhibit a municipality's
ability or inclination to pursue subversive exclusionary policies. Unfor-
56. For more extensive discussion of the economics of this situation, see part II.A.2.
57. Indeed, as early as Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. 151, 336 N.E.2d 713 (1975), the court stressed
the exclusionary effect of the township's exactions. And in Mount Laurel II, the court went fur-
ther, requiring municipalities to remove all exactions not necessary to health and safety in order to
meet their obligations to provide low-cost housing. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390, 441 (1983) [Mount Laurel II].
58. See, for example, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 197.307(3) (1991 Replacement) (requiring munici-
palities to permit "needed housing" within "zones with sufficient buildable land to satisfy that
need," but not requiring municipalities to provide incentives for such housing, nor prohibiting the
discriminatory use of exactions); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 674:32 (1986 Replacement ed.) (prohibit-
ing exclusion of manufactured housing from municipalities, but making no provision requiring in-
centives to build such housing). See generally Briffault, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 69-71 (cited in note
55) (describing ineffectiveness of state statutory controls on exclusionary zoning).
59. See, for example, Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.2d 314 (Fla.
1976) Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). See generally
John J. Delaney, Larry A. Gordon and Kathryn J. Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified
Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, Law & Contemp.
Probs. 139 (Winter 1987).
60. See also Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost?, Law & Contemp. Probs. 115, 126 (Winter
1987) (characterizing exactions as "the latest sheepskin for the wolf of exclusionary zoning").
Of course, it is also true that a determined municipality could use exactions for inclusionary
purposes, as some cities have in creating "linkage" programs. Moreover, when courts or legislatures
mandate inclusionary zoning programs, municipalities might use exactions to finance those pro-
grams, as, for instance, by imposing mandatory set-asides on developers, or by offering developers
bonuses for developing low-income housing. See, for example, Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
61. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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tunately, the Nollan nexus test 62 also does little to eliminate this prob-
lem. So long as a municipality could show that a new development
would generate costs that would not be offset by ordinary taxa-
tion-and housing for the poor will inevitably generate such costs-an
exaction to cover additional costs would satisfy the Nollan nexus re-
quirement and, therefore, probably would be constitutional. The exac-
tion, if imposed, would instantly doom any low-cost housing project. To
inhibit exclusion, legal controls on exactions must be far more stringent
than those articulated in Nollan. They must at least limit the categories
of costs a municipality could recover through exactions.
III. DOES COMPETITION MATTER? THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
INTERMUNICIPAL COMPETITION
The preceding Section established that municipal officials may use
exactions not only to raise revenue, but also to exclude unwanted devel-
opment. Professor Been's article focuses on the concern that municipal-
ities will actually collect exorbitantly high exactions.6 3 In it, she
suggests that competition among municipalities will restrict municipal
ability to collect exactions, and she criticizes those who would constrain
municipal exaction power." Both Professor Been and those she criti-
cizes are right. Professor Been is right that perfect competition among
municipalities would reduce, if not eliminate, municipal power to col-
lect exactions that distort the housing market. But competition among
municipalities will have little effect on municipal ability to capture eco-
nomic rents associated with land, leading instead to claims of unfair-
ness by existing landowners and to rent-seeking behavior.
A. Exactions in a Competitive Market: Exactions and Rent-Seeking
Competitive markets are those in which no single supplier controls
enough of the market to affect the price of the goods he supplies. 5 That
is, in a competitive market, each supplier faces a horizontal demand
curve. Each supplier is a price-taker who will be unable to sell any
goods if he charges more than the market price. 6  The market dictates
62. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
63. Professor Been expressly reserves discussion of another problem associated with exac-
tions-"underregulation", or selling development rights too cheaply. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev., at
505 (cited in note 10).
64. Id. at 478, 532-33, 545.
65. See, for example, Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation 26
(Dryden, 4th ed. 1970) (listing as a requirement of pure competition that "[e]ach buyer and each
seller of the product involved must be so small in relation to the entire market for the product that
he cannot influence the price of whatever it is he is buying or selling").
66. Id. at 104-05.
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the price the supplier can reap on each unit sold; the supplier need only
decide how many units to produce.6 7 In general, the supplier will con-
tinue to produce units until the marginal cost of an additional unit ex-
ceeds the market price for the good.68
Suppose now that the housing market were composed of enough
land developers, spread into enough municipalities, to assure that each
developer is a price-taker. Suppose further that a single municipality
were to impose on developers a fee of $1,000 for each residential unit
built within the municipality. What effect would such an exaction
have? In a competitive market, the answer depends in part on the alter-
native land uses available to landowners and developers. But unless the
land is almost as valuable for other purposes as it is for residential pur-
poses, the exaction should have no effect on the price or supply of hous-
ing. As the next section will demonstrate, the principal effect of the
exaction will be to transfer wealth from landowners to the
municipality.69
1. The Effect of a Nondiscriminating Exaction
Suppose that a municipality were to impose a $1,000 tax or an ex-
action on every acre of land within the municipality, independent of the
particular use to which the acre is put. Or, equivalently, suppose that
the municipality imposes an exaction only on residential construction,
but that the only market for land within the municipality is for residen-
tial construction. In either event, no one can derive benefit from the
land without paying the exaction. What effect would such an exaction
have on the market for land?
Because, by hypothesis, the housing market is competitive, poten-
tial residents will pay no more for housing in this municipality than in a
variety of other municipalities. To compete with landowners in other
municipalities, then, a landowner in the exaction-imposing municipality
67. Id. at 106.
68. Id. at 184.
69. Much economic literature has focused on the incidence of property taxation generally.
For a survey that attempts to reconcile seemingly inconsistent conclusions, see Peter Mieszkowski
and George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes,
Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1098 (1989). The principal
debate has been between those who espouse the "classical" view that property taxation is a form of
neutral benefits taxation, see, for example, Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in
a System of Local Governments, 12 Urban Stud. 205 (1975), and those who subscribe to the "new"
view that property taxes are a distortionary and redistributive tax on capital, see Mieszkowsi and
Zodrow, 27 J. Econ. Literature at 1010-1013.
Despite their superficial similarity, exactions differ fundamentally from ordinary property
taxes because they are not assessed based on the value of improvements to land. For that reason,
the debate over property tax incidence is only marginally relevant to determining the incidence of
exactions.
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will have to reduce her land price by the full $1,000 of the exaction.
Since, by hypothesis, the only market for the land is for uses subject to
the exaction, the landowner's only choices are to take the reduced price
offered by potential developers, or to leave the land unused. Because
the market is assumed to be competitive, all residential developers will
be willing to pay the same reduced price, but no more; at any higher
price, developers will operate only in other municipalities. Hence, so
long as the landowner has no alternative uses for her land, the land-
owner will bear the full brunt of the exaction.70 The resulting reduction
in the price of land will have no effect on production of land because
land supply is, for all practical purposes, constant. The landowner's re-
turn on his land is, as Henry George emphasized, 7 1 economic rent, and
the exaction scheme operates to transfer that economic rent from the
landowner to the municipality.
Put in other terms, the supply of land, represented by S on Figure
1 below, is generally inelastic. The price developers will pay for that
land is P-the price at which the demand curve (D) intersects with
that supply curve. If a municipality were to impose an exaction of
$1,000 on each unit of housing developed, developers would be willing
to pay $1,000 less for each unit of land, reflecting the lower net price
they would be able to collect from buyers of housing. Hence, the de-
70. Professor Been recognizes the point. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 541 (cited in note 10)
(noting that the landowner bears the full cost of exaction when the demand for land is relatively
elastic and the landowner has no alternative uses for land). See also Richard P. Adelstein and Noel
M. Edelson, Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities, 5 J. Legal Stud. 147 (1976).
Adelstein and Edelson summarize the point as follows:
Capital theory teaches that the price of land equals the present value of net rents from the
most advantageous use to which it can be put. If those net rents are altered, whether by land
exactions, fees, or subsidies, the price of land should adjust accordingly. Therefore the owner
of land at the time such regulations are promulgated (who may not yet be the developer and
who almost certainly will not be the home buyer) will receive the capital gain or loss.
Id. at 160. See also John J. Kirlin and Anne M. Kirlin, Public Choices-Private Resources 61, 68
(Cal. Tax Found., 1982) (suggesting that the incidence of development fees, although initially
borne by developers, will ultimately be shifted to landowners).
Analysts who question whether developers can shift the incidence of exactions to landowners
ignore or deemphasize the "economic rent" aspect of any return on land. It is elementary price
theory that immobile resources receive only the residual available after more mobile resources have
been paid whatever is necessary to keep them from being put to other uses. See, for example,
Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation at 295 (cited in note 65). Yet some analysts,
while acknowledging that developers might leave a competitive market unless land prices are re-
duced by the cost of impact fees, nevertheless conclude that landowners would not bear a large
share of the impact fee burden. See Forrest E. Huffman, et al., Who Bears the Burden of Develop-
ment Impact Fees?, 54 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 49, 51 (1988). In support of their conclusion, they invoke
unspecified "property tax incidence theory", and irrational behavior by landowners-including a
failure by landowners to consider the time-value of money. Id. These same analysts also note, more
cogently, that uncertainty about the amount of any future exactions may make it more difficult for
developers to shift the full incidence of impact fees to landowners. Id.
71. Henry George, Progress and Poverty 165-72 (Robert Schalkenbach Found., 1979).
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mand curve will shift downward from D to D', reducing the price devel-
opers will pay to landowners by an amount equal to the $1,000 exaction.
Because the supply of land is inelastic, the reduction in price does not
affect that supply. Any return the landowner receives on the land is








2. Exactions that Discriminate Among Uses
Municipalities typically do not impose exactions equally on all po-
tential land users. Rather, exactions are generally imposed on some
uses, or developments of land, and not on others. A municipality might,
for instance, impose an exaction on new housing, but not on agricultural
land use. The exaction might differentiate between residential and com-
mercial uses, and it almost certainly will apply only to new, rather than
existing, construction. How does this discrimination among uses affect
the analysis developed in the preceding section?
For simplicity, assume that land is in demand for only two uses:
residential construction, potentially subject to an exaction, and agricul-
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tural use, exempt from exactions. The supply of land available for resi-
dential construction is now a function of the demand for agricultural
land; when demand for agricultural land is high, developers must com-
pete for land by paying higher prices. In other words, devoting land to
residential construction now carries with it an opportunity cost. As a
result, the supply curve facing a residential developer will not be a sin-
gle vertical line; instead, landowners will be willing to supply more land
for residential development at higher prices than at lower prices.
The precise shape of the supply curve for residential land will de-
pend on the degree of competition in the land market. But in a per-
fectly competitive market, each landowner in the municipality faces a
horizontal demand curve from potential users of agricultural land. At
price X, agricultural users will pay to devote all available land to agri-
cultural purposes; at any price above X, those users will not pay for any
land within the municipality, but will instead farm elsewhere. In this
situation, the supply curve facing potential residential developers will
consist of two discontinuous vertical lines (See Figure 2). At any price
above X, all land within the municipality will be available for residen-
tial development; at or below the price of X no land will be available,
because it will all be devoted to agricultural uses. If we assume that the
demand curve for residential use, like the demand curve for agricultural
use, is horizontal (reflecting perfect competition among landowners in
various municipalities), and if we assume that the land is more valuable
for residential construction than for agricultural use, the residential
construction demand curve will intersect the vertical supply curve at a
point X 1, representing a price higher than X. In this situation, the dif-
ference in price between X 1 and X represents economic rent. If the mu-
nicipality were to impose an exaction for residential construction in an
amount less than X 1 - X, the exaction would simply transfer wealth
from landowner to municipality. The economic effect would be
equivalent to the effect-discussed in the preceding section-of an ex-
action imposed on all land within the municipality. If, on the other
hand, the municipality were to impose an exaction in an amount greater
than X 1 - X, all land would be devoted to agricultural use, and the
municipality would collect no exactions. A municipality seeking to max-






The discussion so far has assumed that the municipality intervenes
in the land use process only by imposing exactions on particular land
uses. But, of course, most municipalities also regulate land in other
ways, including, in particular, the zoning process. Zoning makes it sig-
nificantly easier for the municipality to impose more substantial exac-
tions even if the zoning ordinance permits the most efficient use of
land. Consider, for instance, a parcel of land most valuable for office
building construction, but also valuable for residential construction. If
the municipality were to impose an exaction on office construction but
not residential construction, the municipality could collect the exaction
only if the exaction amount were smaller than the difference between
the parcel's value for office construction and its value for residential
construction. But if the municipality zones the land for commercial use
only, the municipality has eliminated the alternative use. As a result,
the landowner will be willing to pay a higher exaction because the land-
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owner cannot consider the more attractive residential use alternative.
In terms of the diagram presented above (Figure 2), the zoning ordi-
nance lowers the price (X) at which the landowner would withdraw the
land from the office market, and, therefore, raises the maximum exac-
tion (X1 - X) that the landowner would be willing to pay. Hence, zon-
ing, even if never used to prohibit efficient use, can be used to augment
the municipality's power to extract rents from landowners.7 2
3. Externality-Reducing Exactions
So far, we have assumed that municipalities only impose exactions
to raise revenue. But, of course, municipalities often use exactions to
recover infrastructure costs created by new development. 73 In these
cases, the municipality impose the exaction to assure that the developer
internalizes costs that he might otherwise pass on to existing residents.
Note, however, that the landowner will bear the full cost of any
exaction regardless of the municipality's motive for imposing it. Sup-
pose, for instance, the exaction reflects the high cost to the municipality
of providing sewage facilities for the new development. From the
homebuyer's standpoint, a home in this municipality is still no better
than a home in another municipality where sewage can be provided
more cheaply. From the developer's perspective, then, profits in this
municipality will be equal to profits elsewhere only if the developer can
buy the land at a price low enough to compensate for the cost of the
exaction. Hence, the price the landowner will be able to reap from the
developer will be diminished by the full amount of the exaction. 74
72. This, in large measure appears to be the concern articulated by Justice Scalia in footnote
5 of his opinion for the Supreme Court in the Nollan case:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police power is allowed
would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served
than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987).
See also William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
101, 107-08 (Winter 1987) (analogizing sale of land use regulations to use of artificially low speed
limits to collect revenue from "unwary nonresidents").
73. See Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 483 (cited in note 10).
74. The significant difference between exactions calculated to compensate existing residents
for externalities imposed by new development and exactions not so calculated is that externality-
based exactions promote efficient land use, while other exactions do not. The difference has proven
important in legal doctrine. State case law has generally upheld exactions and impact fees that
permit municipalities to recover documented costs generated by new development. See, for exam-
ple, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966);
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). Justice Scalia's
opinion in Nollan, with its emphasis on the relation between condition and permit approval, sug-
gests that the Supreme Court would have no difficulty sustaining externality-based exactions
against constitutional attack. For an analysis of linkage programs which suggest that they are im-
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4. Exactions and Dealmaking in a Competitive Market
The preceding sections have assumed that the municipality pro-
vides landowners and prospective developers with advance information
about exactions or impact fees. That is, the municipality might, either
by formal enactment or through a less formal mechanism, adopt a
schedule of fees. In fact, however, pre-set standards rarely determine
the amount of municipal exactions; instead, exactions are generally the
product of dealmaking between municipality and developer.75 Develop-
ers may not know the exaction fees until they seek municipal approval
for their projects. This section examines whether imperfect advance in-
formation about exactions threatens either to distort land markets or to
increase the risk of unfairness to landowners or developers.
First, consider the effect of uncertainty on the developer's behavior
at the time he seeks approval for his project. If the developer has al-
ready purchased the land on which he hopes to build, the excess of the
purchase price over the land's value for uses which will not require pay-
ment of an exaction is a sunk cost. So long as the exaction demanded
by the municipality is smaller than the difference between the land's
value for exaction-related purposes and the land's value for other pur-
poses, the developer is better off going ahead with his project regardless
of the purchase price the developer originally paid to the landowner.
Consider now the effect of uncertainty on negotiations between the
developer and the landowner. Without knowing how much the munici-
pality will exact as a condition for approving a project, the developer
has no basis for deciding how much to offer the landowner for the
land. 6 If the legal system does not constrain municipalities in setting
exaction prices, the developer might well expect the municipality to im-
pose an exaction just less than the difference between the value of the
permissible because they do not redress any externality problems, see Comment, Mitigating Price
Effect.s with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 721 (1990).
The significant controversy generated by Nollan, and by Professor Been's article, focuses on
those municipal exactions that cannot be directly related to costs generated by new development.
75. Siemon, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter, 1987, at 115, 123-24 (cited in note 60); Bauman
and Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, Law-&
Contemp. Probs. at 51, 56-57, esp. n.18 (noting a survey which demonstrated that most off-site
exactions were negotiated rather than specified in regulations).
"Development agreements," in which exactions form part of a broader deal between developer
and municipality, are perhaps the most extreme form of land use control by dealmaking. See gen-
erally Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
22 Urban Law. 23 (1990); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract
Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use
Deals, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 957 (1987).
76. Compare Huffman, et al., 54 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n at 51 (cited in note 70).
To avoid uncertainty, the landowner might seek a commitment from the municipality before
buying the land. Compare Adelstein and Edelson, 5 J. Legal Stud. at 161 (cited in note 70).
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land for the projected development and the value of the land for uses
which do not require an exaction. But if the developer forms such an
expectation, he might insist either that any purchase agreement be con-
ditioned on the amount of the exaction the municipality demands or
that the landowner share in payment of any exaction." If these more
complex transactions increase the cost of doing business, the value of
land for development purposes will decline, and with that decline will
come diminished municipal ability to collect exactions. So long as the
land market remains perfectly competitive, however, neither developers
nor landowners will have the opportunity to collect exactions from their
customers, housing consumers. Any increase in price to consumers will
drive those consumers to other municipalities, resulting in reduced mu-
nicipal revenue from exactions.
Thus, even if municipalities use dealmaking rather than rulemak-
ing as the mechanism for setting exaction prices, exactions are unlikely
to affect the supply of housing. When deals, not rules, serve as the basis
for setting exaction levels, municipal officials will have the opportunity
to discriminate among developers. They could permit "favored" devel-
opers to proceed with relatively small exactions, while demanding sub-
stantially more-up to the economic rent associated with the
land-from "disfavored" developers.78 Finding means to combat this
sort of discrimination has been a major focus of land use scholarship
during the past 30 years;79 a legal rule that would permit municipal offi-
cials to collect whatever they can bargain for would increase municipal
discretion to play favorites.8
5. Exactions and Rent-Seeking
As shown above,81 in a perfectly competitive market, competition
among municipalities assures, as Professor Been predicts, 8 that exac-
77. Alternatively, the developer might choose to bear the risk of municipal exactions, gam-
bling that the municipality will exact less than he and the landowner anticipate.
78. See generally Sterk, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1747-51 (cited in note 7).
79. See Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 853-57, 893-910 (1983) (suggesting that "voice," together with the
potential for "exit," rather than close judicial scrutiny of rezoning decisions, should serve as a
check against arbitrariness); Daniel Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in
Land Use Regulation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 972 (1976) (suggesting that mandatory planning may
provide a check against arbitrariness); Charles Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan", 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1174 (1955) (arguing that requiring a comprehensive plan gives
courts a standard against which to measure zoning decisions).
80. Siemon, Law & Contemp. Probs. at 124 (cited in note 60). Professor Been recognized
these dangers, but classified them as dangers of underregulation, and reserved them for future
treatment. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 505-06 (cited in note 10).
81. See notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
82. See Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 511 (cited in note 10).
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tions will not distort housing markets. Because landowners alone will
bear the burden of exactions, municipal exaction policies will not oper-
ate to increase housing costs.
The above analysis also reveals, however, that even in a perfectly
competitive market, exactions increase opportunities for rent-seeking
behavior. If exactions were prohibited, individuals and groups seeking
to acquire the rents associated with land would have to buy the land,
presumably with money derived from productive activity. But if munic-
ipal officials are free, through liberal use of exactions, to confiscate some
or all of the economic rent associated with land, those same individuals
and groups might find it easier to acquire rent by directing their ener-
gies into lobbying efforts or campaign contributions-activities that do
not add to the pool of social wealth. 3
Competition among municipalities does not limit the opportunities
for rent-seeking. A developer obviously cares about the price of ob-
taining land for development, but whether that price is paid to the
landowner or to the municipality, in the form of an exaction, is a matter
of indifference to the developer. Hence, competition from other munici-
palities would, in a competitive market, provide no impediment to rent-
seeking behavior.8 4
Moreover, the volatile nature of the housing market, and hence the
land market, increases municipal opportunity to capture rents. Because
new construction makes up such a small percentage of the overall hous-
ing market,8 5 a modest increase in demand for housing increases sub-
stantially the demand for new housing.86 That increase in demand, in
turn, increases the demand for land, and hence the economic rent avail-
able to the landowner.8 7 In times of peak construction, therefore, mu-
83. See generally Sterk, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1744-46 (cited in note 7); Richard A. Epstein,
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 713-14 (1984).
84. Professor Been's analogy to corporate charters, where competition did limit rent-seeking
by state governments, see Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 533-39 (cited in note 10), is an imperfect one.
Individuals and groups seeking corporate charters possess mobile capital; if a particular state of-
fered unattractive terms, they could look elsewhere. Landowners, by contrast, have no alternative
but to deal with the municipality in which their land is located. The difference is critical; it ex-
plains why competition may be inadequate to prevent municipalities from rent-seeking through
exaction policies.
85. In the 1970s, for instance, housing starts averaged 2.6% of the nation's total housing
stock. Edwin Mills and Bruce Hamilton, Urban Economics 212 (Scott, Foresman, 4th ed., 1989).
86. The American housing industry has grown and shrunk by as much as 50% over a two-
year period. Id. at 211. As Mills and Hamilton point out, to increase the housing stock by just over
1% in a single year would require a 50% increase in new construction. Id. at 212.
87. Indeed, the volatile nature of the housing market may also enable developers to collect
economic rents-rents the municipality would then be able to capture. Developers tend to work
with little permanent staff and few financial commitments. Id. Suppose that, in the short term,
existing developers cannot substantially increase their housing production capacity, and new devel-
opers do not or cannot enter the market (either because start-up costs prevent them from entering
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nicipalities have significantly enhanced opportunities to capture land
rents.
Professor Been is well aware of the problems associated with rent-
seeking."' This Article does not seek to editorialize on the evils of rent-
seeking. Virtually all redistribution of wealth is the product of rent-
seeking, and unless one opposes all redistribution, it is difficult to treat
all rent-seeking as undesirable. The point is that for those who do view
rent-seeking as an evil, legal constraints on municipal power to impose
exactions may remain warranted.
B. Exactions in an Imperfect Market
The preceding section demonstrated that competition prevents mu-
nicipalities from collecting exactions that would alter the market alloca-
tion of land. Professor Been's article focuses on the effect of
competition among municipalities, but even if an entire region were
composed of a single municipality, competition in the market for land
within the municipality would prevent the municipality from collecting
exactions that would alter market allocation. So long as landowners
within the municipality face horizontal demand curves (as they might if
there are numerous sellers of equivalent land within the municipality),
the entire burden of any collectable exaction 9 would fall on the
landowner.
Suppose, however, the market for land within the municipality
were not perfect. Suppose that neither the supply of land within the
municipality nor competition from other municipalities suffice to create
a horizontal demand curve for land. What impact would an exaction
in time to take advantage of peak demand, or because the volatility of the industry makes the
long-run prospects of entry unattractive). In these circumstances, existing developers would find
themselves able to profit more from sales to homebuyers than from investing their time and capital
in any other endeavor. That is, the developers would reap what appears to be economic rent.
Because of the volatility of the housing market, however, high profits in boom times may be
necessary to keep developers from quitting the business during slow times. Hence, in the long run,
these profits may not be economic rents, and municipal attempts to capture them may result in
increased housing prices.
On the other hand, conventional wisdom holds that a little land or a little cash will allow
anyone to become a homebuilder. Landis, Land Regulation and the Price of Neu, Housing, APA
Journal, at 9 (Winter 1986). If conventional wisdom is correct-a contention Landis dis-
putes-there are no entry barriers in the homebuilding industry, and thus no opportunities for
economic rents.
88. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 492 (cited in note 10).
89. As discussed earlier, if the municipality were to impose an exaction on some uses but not
others, the impact of the exaction would fall entirely on landowners as long as the exaction did not
exceed the difference between the demand price for the use subject to the exaction and the de-
mand price for other uses. If the municipality were to impose a greater exaction, it would not be





First, if the amount of the exaction were known, and if the exaction
did not discriminate among uses, the exaction would fall entirely upon
the landowner and would not alter allocation of land among various
uses, even if the market for land were noncompetitive. Because the sup-
ply of land is inelastic, a downward shift in the demand curve to ac-
count for the exaction will simply reduce the equilibrium price for land,
regardless of the shape of the demand curve facing landowners.
If, however, the exaction discriminates among uses (as most exac-
tions do), the situation is different. Assume for simplicity that the de-
mand for land can be divided into two components:* demand for uses on
which the municipality contemplates imposing an exaction (D1 on Fig-
ure 3), and demand for other uses (D2 ). Although the total supply of
land within the municipality (ST) is fixed, the supply for uses that
might become subject to the exaction is not; that supply is a function of
the demand for other uses. In other words, at any price P, the supply of
land available for uses subject to the contemplated exaction will be
equal to the total quantity of land minus the quantity demanded at
price P for other uses. Assuming that landowners face downward-slop-
ing demand curves for both exaction-related uses and other uses, the








Suppose now that the municipality imposes the exaction. The de-
mand curve for uses subject to the exaction will shift downward (from
demand curve DB to demand curve DA on Figure 4). That is, each de-
veloper of a use subject to the exaction will be willing to buy the same
quantity of land as before the exaction so long as the price of land de-
creases by the amount of the exaction. Again, it makes no difference to
the developer whether the landowner or the municipality collects her
money; she is concerned only with the ultimate cost of the land. Now,
however, the shift in the demand curve affects the quantity of land sold
for purposes subject to the exaction: As the developer reduces the price
she is willing to pay to the landowner, the landowner sells more land for
uses not subject to the exaction. Instead of selling qB units for purposes
subject to the exaction, the landowner will sell only qA units. Although
the developer will pay less money (pBL) to the landowner, the total
price paid by the developer-including the exaction paid to the munici-
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pality-will rise from PA to PBT" This rise will, in turn, cause a shift in
the supply curve that faces the developer's customers, resulting in a rise
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Nollan's nexus requirement does not, however, prevent a munici-
pality from exploiting monopoly power to increase price and decrease
supply of housing within its borders. Even if exactions were forbidden
entirely, municipalities could, if not constrained by law, impose devel-
opment quotas or restrictive zoning requirements that would reduce the
supply of housing in the community and increase its cost.90 This exer-
cise of monopoly power would benefit existing homeowners by inflating
the price of used housing. 91
90. For the classic discussion, see Ellickson, 86 Yale L. J. at 394-99 (cited in note 19).
91. Id. at 400.
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Exactions, however, increase the incentives for municipalities to ex-
ercise monopoly power. First, many interest groups within the munici-
pality have reasons to support the imposition of exactions; by contrast,
only homeowners benefit substantially from growth controls that pre-
clude construction of new housing.9 2 Second, exactions provide an im-
mediate return to existing homeowners (in the form of lower taxes or
increased services), while those homeowners must wait until they sell
their homes to realize the pecuniary gains associated with a restrictive
zoning ordinance. Third, large lot size requirements and other restric-
tive zoning controls generate costs that benefit no one; by contrast, all
costs generated by exactions are immediately transferable to existing
residents.9 3 Because exactions enable municipalities to exploit monop-
oly power more efficiently than conventional zoning controls, legal con-
straints on the power to impose exactions may be particularly
important. 4
The basic point is this: So long as landowners face downward-slop-
ing demand curves, exactions have the potential to distort land use
within any municipality. Unless competition among municipalities
transforms downward-sloping demand curves into horizontal ones, in-
termunicipal competition does not eliminate the potential for inefficien-
cies induced by exactions.
IV. How "PERFECT" IS COMPETITION AMONG MUNICIPALITIES?
In exploring the ability of a revenue-maximizing municipality to
impose exactions and impact fees, the discussion so far has demon-
strated that even when land markets are characterized by perfect com-
petition, municipalities have the power, through the use of exactions, to
capture economic rents associated with land. Moreover, when competi-
tion in land markets is imperfect, municipalities can impose exactions
that go beyond the capture of rents and that lead to the substitution of
inefficient for efficient uses of land.
For those whose unease about exactions stems from concerns about
rent-seeking, perhaps the case for limiting municipal power to impose
92. In homogeneous suburbs where homeowners dominate local politics, this difference may
be insignificant. But, as Ellickson points out, many municipalities, especially larger ones, are gov-
erned by coalitions of interest groups. Id. at 407-410. In any municipality where homeowner inter-
ests are not in complete control, exactions increase the incentive for exercise of the municipality's
monopoly power.
93. Id. at 396-97.
94. See William Fischel, Exploring the Kazinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation
a Taking of Property? (U. Cal. Berkeley Law & Economics working paper #10, forthcoming 1992).
Professor Fischel argues that takings jurisprudence should provide greater protection against effi-




exactions is already compelling. But for those concerned about ineffi-
cient allocation of land and consequent price inflation in the markets
for housing, offices, and the like, an obvious question remains: How
competitive are land markets? If, as Professor Been suggests, 95 land in
one community is largely interchangeable with land in neighboring
communities, intermunicipal competition may bring horizontal demand
curves to land markets, even when a single municipality's limited sup-
ply of land might suggest some monopoly power. This section, then,
considers several factors that might influence the degree of in-
termunicipal competition.
A. The Effect of Municipality Size on Competition: the Case of
Central Cities
If a metropolitan area were composed of a large number of homoge-
neous municipalities, competition among them might well constrain
municipal power to impose inefficiency-creating exactions. 6 But munic-
ipalities within most metropolitan areas are not uniform. Most metro-
politan areas are dominated by a central city whose size and character
differ significantly from those of neighboring municipalities.9 7
While competition from neighboring suburbs may limit the central
city's power to collect market-distorting exactions from residential de-
velopers, it is less likely to constrain exactions on commercial develop-
ment. For many businesses, suburbs furnish at best a poor substitute
for the central city. Transportation networks that converge on the cen-
tral city provide the city with a significant advantage over suburban
locations in the competition for employers. Public transportation sys-
tems make city employment feasible for lower-paid employees who lack
access to suburban work sites. Moreover, in some industries-law comes
to mind-the prestige associated with a central city location may be
95. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 510 (cited in note 10) (suggesting that consumers perceive
most communities as having close substitutes).
96. Although, as already demonostrated, competition will not constrain municipal power to
compel transfer of economic rents for landowners. See notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
97. Social science literature emphasizes the ways in which the economic and political founda-
tions of central cities differ from those of suburbs. See, for example, Julius Margolis, Public Poli-
cies for Private Profits: Urban Government, in Harold Hochman and George Peterson, eds.,
Redistribution Through Public Choice 289, 317 (Columbia, 1974) (noting an imbalance in central
cities between the economic base (nonresident businesses) and political power (voting strength of
the poor), an imbalance not found in suburban communities); David F. Bradford and Wallace E.
Oates, Suburban Exploitation in Central Cities and Governmental Structure, in id. at 43 (noting
that competition among municipalities leads better-off city dwellers to prefer suburbs where they
will be among the less well-off residents); David F. Bradford and Harry H. Kelejian, An
Econometric Model of the Flight to the Suburbs, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 566, 567 (1973) (noting a "vi-
cious circle" facing central cities: "the more rapidly the middle class families move to the suburbs,
the greater is the incentive for the exodus of those remaining").
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critical even if other locations would be equally convenient.9 8 The com-
paratively high cost of downtown office space reflects, to a large degree,
these competitive advantages. 9
To some extent, of course, the market for office space-more so
than the market for residential space-is national rather than regional.
If the cost of business in New York becomes too high, a company might
relocate to Atlanta or Houston. Hence, the availability of office space in
other central cities may act as a constraint on each city's monopoly
power. For businesses with a local or regional base, however, relocating
out of the area is not a realistic alternative. And for the national firms
that require offices in every major city, a threat to move elsewhere
would not be a serious one.
The availability of suburban office space (and space in other cities)
does impose some constraints on the central city. Virtually all partici-
pants in the market for office space will move from the city to the sub-
urbs if the price differential becomes too great. But every monopolist
faces similar constraints. A local utility with a monopoly on the gas sup-
ply, even if free from government regulation, would face the possibility
that consumers would shift to oil if gas prices climbed too high. If a
monopolist telephone company raised prices too much, consumers
would make more extensive use of express mail. The complete absence
of substitutes is not a necessary condition for monopoly power; a sup-
plier of goods and services possesses monopoly power whenever substi-
tutes are imperfect. And the price differential between city and
suburban office space indicates that, for consumers of commercial office
space, the suburbs remain an imperfect substitute for the city. Hence,
competition from the suburbs will not eliminate the central city's power
to collect market-distorting development exactions.
As demonstrated earlier, 100 however, even if there were no competi-
98. See, for example, Scott Chase, Cost of Office Space Seen Creating "Three-Tiered" Mar-
ket, Washington Post, October 12, 1981, p. 17 (noting that downtown office space is likely to be
occupied by financial institutions, service companies (including law firms) and executive headquar-
ters willing to "pay exorbitant rents for prime downtown office space" in order to assure "high
visibility" and "prestige"); Anthony De Palma, Office Development Surges in Suburbs, New York
Times, May 25, 1986, sec. 8, p. 1, col. 3. (stating that executives and dealmakers stay in prestigious
Manhattan locations, but back offices go elsewhere.)
99. The significant price differential betwee office space in central cities and office space in
suburban areas reflects the higher value of central city land (except to the extent that construction
costs are higher in cities). This higher land value is itself economic rent. For discussions of rent
differentials between office space in cities and suburbs, see Anne Swardson, Troubling Signs of an
Office Exodus, Washington Post, September 30, 1991, p. F1 (noting a $10/square foot difference
between the city and the suburbs); David Dunlap, Back-Office Tenants Slipping Out of Town,
New York Times, April 22, 1984, sec. 8, p. 1, col. 6 (stating that office rents in Manhattan range
from $30-55; comparable suburban space rents for $15-35).
100. See notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
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tion among municipalities, municipally-imposed exactions could not, by
themselves, produce distortions in land allocation so long as competi-
tion within any particular municipality assures that individual land-
owners face horizontal demand curves for each potential use of land. In
a large city, the number of landowners likely will suffice to assure that
demand curves are horizontal.
The problem, however, is that if a city does not face competiion
from other municipalities, it can combine the use of exactions and zon-
ing to distort land allocation and maximize municipal revenue. For in-
stance, the municipality can, through zoning, significantly reduce the
supply of land for office construction. '0 ' That reduction in available
supply will result in an increase in price for the remaining parcels zoned
for office construction. Since the municipality can impose an exaction of
any amount between the value of land for office construction purposes
and the value for other purposes, the zoning ordinance may increase the
municipality's ability to collect exactions by raising the value of all land
zoned for commercial purposes.
Figure 5 illustrates the problem. Suppose the supply of land for
office construction purposes, before zoning, is represented by two dis-
jointed lines, S. This supply curve reveals that at all prices below P 1,
landowners will devote their land to some use other than office con-
struction; at prices above P 1, landowners will devote all land to office
construction purposes. Assume that the demand curve for office con-
struction land is represented by D, which intersects the supply curve S
at point A. The city has capacity to impose an exaction in an amount
equal to PA - P 1, and to collect those exactions on QA units. Thus, the
city's total revenue would be represented by the rectangle ACJE. Sup-
pose now that the city zones only QB units of land for office construc-
tion. The supply curve for office construction now shifts to S'.102 The
new equilibrium price for office construction land will rise to PB" The
city will now be able to collect an exaction equal to the rectangle
BFGH-which, depending on the slope of the demand curve, may be
significantly greater than ACJE.
101. For instance, when high demand for office space in New York City's garment district led
to increased costs for the garment industry, the city acted to protect the garment industry by
creating a "preservation" district-including 8 million square feet in 105 buildings-to be used for
manufacturing. See Real Estate Board, Inc. v. City of New York, 157 A.D.2d 361, 556 N.Y.S.2d
853 (1990) (sustaining the ordinance against attack as violative of the state's environmental
statute).
102. The discontinuity in S' may come at a price lower than the discontinuity in S, because
the zoning ordinance may, by restricting the supply of land for office construction, increase the
supply of land (and hence decrease the equilibrium price) for other purposes. If so, uses other than





This opportunity is only available to a city without significant com-
petition from other municipalities. If landowners in other municipalities
could provide substitutes for land that is subject to the exaction, the
city's decreased supply of land for office construction purposes would
not lead to an increase in price; developers would simply develop else-
where. Only if there is no good substitute for city land will zoning re-
strictions expand the city's opportunity to collect exactions.
One might well object that these opportunities for a monopolistic
city to create distortions in the land market may result not from the




nance.' 03 The objection, however, ignores two important facts. First, po-
litical opposition might prevent the city from enacting an overly
restrictive ordinance if the exaction is available as a mechanism to as-
sure continued development.10 4 Second, giving the city a right to impose
an exaction increases the city's incentive to enact the restrictive zoning
ordinance.10 5 If the city seeks to maximize revenue, the restrictive zon-
ing ordinance benefits the city only to the extent that it increases op-
portunities to collect exactions. 06
Hence, unless a city is faced with significant competition from
neighboring municipalities, rules permitting even a large city to make
liberal use of exactions can provide incentives that result in a misalloca-
tion of land. For some uses-particularly commercial ones-suburban
land is a poor substitute for downtown land. Even in a large municipal-
ity, restrictions on use of exactions, therefore, may be desirable to avoid
distortions in land markets.
B. Uniqueness and the Tiebout Hypothesis
Professor Been's thesis rests substantially on Tiebout's argument
that competition would regulate the municipal provision of public goods
because potential residents would "shop" among municipalities to find
one that provided the mix of public goods best suited to their desires. 10 7
Paradoxically, however, Tiebout's theory undercuts Professor Been's
hypothesis: If Tiebout was correct, a sorting process would make mu-
nicipalities sufficiently unique to prevent competition among them from
constraining the municipal imposition of exactions.
Tiebout argued that residents and potential residents dissatisfied
with the mix of public goods offered by one municipality remain free to
103. Compare Fischel, Law & Contemp. Probs. at 111 (cited in note 52).
104. Professor Kreimer has made the point that often political and practical realities make it
impossible for government to deny benefits across the board, while the same realities would not
prevent selective denial. As Professor Kreimer puts it, "[ilt is only this practical or political resis-
tance that makes the government's possession of the greater power at all tolerable. Allowing the
government to deny benefits to some, but not all, of the populace gives it a power that is nowhere
implicit in the power to deny benefits absolutely." Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1313 (1984).
105. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987); see also
Fischel, Law & Contemp. Probs. at 106 (cited in note 52). Professor Fischel's view is that the
problem can best be solved by invalidating overly restrictive zoning ordinances, not by restricting
municipal power to collect exactions.
106. Of course, municipalities use zoning for purposes other than revenue generation; in par-
ticular, zoning enables municipalities to reduce externalities by separating incompatible uses. The
point here, however, is that the potential for increased revenue through exactions gives municipali-
ties an incentive to use the zoning process for purposes other than externality reduction.
107. Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 506-528 (cited in note 10).
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choose a different municipality.108 If enough different municipalities co-
exist within the same geographical area, competition among municipali-
ties should shape the mix of public goods provided by each of them. 109
A municipality that offers an unattractive package will find it difficult
to draw the residents necessary to pay for the public goods it does offer.
Competition among municipalities, according to Tiebout, will not
be limited to price. Although competition will induce municipalities to
provide services at the lowest possible price, 110 they will also compete
by offering different packages to satisfy the tastes of different consum-
ers."' Just as a seller of private goods might seek to develop a "market
niche"-to appeal to a particular subset of consumers-municipalities
will offer packages of public goods designed to satisfy particular con-
sumer tastes. Thus, some communities will appeal to residents who
want better schools and parks and who are willing to pay higher taxes
for them. Other cities will appeal to those concerned only about schools
or only about parks, or to those more concerned about taxes than about
the quality of any public services.
With enough municipalities, this competition for residents would
permit each potential resident, by choosing among municipalities, to
buy precisely the desired quantity of public goods. Moreover, Tiebout-
style competition assures cost control for municipal services; if one mu-
nicipality taxes more than another for the same services, fewer poten-
tial residents will choose to locate within that municipality's borders
(or, alternatively, prices for land within the municipality will decline,
resulting in political pressure on municipal officials to keep costs
down)."'
The Tiebout model assumes that consumers can costlessly move
from one municipality to another in pursuit of fiscal policies to their
liking." ' The model also assumes that consumers have adequate infor-
mation about municipal policies and practices." 4 These unrealistic as-
sumptions raise questions about the Tiebout model."1 5 But if the
108. Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ. at 420 (cited in note 19).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 420, 421.
112. Id. at 422, n.18.
113. Id. at 419. One survey of actual consumer behavior concludes, however, that "so few
citizens intended to invoke the exit response that it hardly appears to constitute a major form of
political participation." David Lowery and William Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Bounda-
ries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. Pol. 73, 92-93 (1989).
114. Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ. at 420.
115. See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 93,
93 (1981) (suggesting that "[tihe pure [Tiebout] model . . . involves a set of assumptions so pa-




Tiebout model captures the decisionmaking process for anyone, it does
so for new residents without preexisting ties to any particular munici-
pality-residents choosing from among the many municipalities in a
metropolitan area. Those potential residents are the principal custom-
ers for housing developers and, derivatively, for landowners. And em-
pirical work suggests that consumers do choose municipalities, at least
in part, based on the offered package of goods and services. 116
To the extent that the Tiebout model accurately portrays the mu-
nicipal housing market, the model suggests that suburbs are not fungi-
ble. The Tiebout model assures efficient expenditures on public goods
only if municipalities offer tax and service packages that are sufficiently
varied to give potential residents a significant opportunity to "vote with
their feet." But if each municipality offers a unique set of taxes and
services, then each muncipality possesses a degree of monopoly power:
Potential residents will be willing to pay more for housing in the com-
munity than the marginal cost of producing that housing. 117 To the ex-
tent that cross-elasticity of demand is small, neighboring municipalities
will not eliminate each other's monopoly power. For instance, Scarsdale
and Yonkers, adjacent municipalities in suburban Westchester County,
New York, may be neighboring municipalities, but they are not good
substitutes-at least for potential residents concerned about perceived
school quality or property tax rates." 8
In other words, the existence of Tiebout-style "competition" would
serve not to constrain municipal ability to demand exactions from de-
velopers, but rather to increase the likelihood that municipal exactions
will distort the housing market. By responding to consumer demand in
ways that make each of them unique, municipalities make it easier for
developers to pass the cost of exactions on to housing consumers, thus
increasing housing cost and decreasing the quantity of housing
produced."'
116. See Wallace Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Prop-
erty Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. Pol.
Econ. 957 (1969); Gerald McDougall, Local Public Goods and Residential Property Values: Some
Insights and Extension, 29 Nat'l Tax J. 436 (1976).
117. How much monopoly power a municipality enjoys will be a matter of degree. As Tiebout
recognized, "[iln so far as there are a number of communities with similar revenue and expendi-
ture patterns, the solution will approximate the ideal 'market' solution." Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ.
at 421 (cited in note 19).
118. Indeed, a Scarsdale post office address can make a home more valuable-even if the
home, located within Yonkers, receives all of its services from the city of Yonkers. See Elsa Bren-
ner, Yonkers ZIP Code Plan Could Change Addresses, N.Y. Times sec. 12WC, p. 1, col. 1 (June
30, 1991).
119. Of course, if a metropolitan area included enough virtually identical communities or a
broad enough spectrum of similar communities, competition could still operate to constrain exac-




Embedded in local government finance are significant equity and
efficiency questions. 120 What efforts should government make to assess
taxes or fees against those who derive particular benefit from govern-
ment services? How should tax burdens be apportioned between busi-
nesses and residents? Will particular revenue-raising schemes
discourage economic activity that would be of substantial benefit to
municipal residents? For the most part, the American legal system
leaves resolution of these critical questions-questions which often gen-
erate significant conflict within municipalities-to the political
branches of government. Tax law remains subject to few constitutional
limits.1 21
Most local finance questions pit one municipal interest group
against another. Against this background, exactions and impact fees are
an attractive source of revenue for many municipalities. Because exac-
tions often can be collected from outsiders who are not a part of the
political community, exaction revenues can help diffuse fiscal tensions
that might otherwise plague a municipality. Moreover, exactions and
impact fees rarely appear as a blatant grab for money; municipalities
can always point to costs that new development generates and justify
the exaction or impact fee as a means of recouping those costs.
But exactions also raise the possibility of abuse: Inequitable "taxa-
tion without representation," accompanied by the efficiency losses that
might result from the reduction in housing supply or the increase in the
cost of housing, or of commercial construction. In light of this potential
for abuse, the Nollan opinion, together with other commentary on exac-
tions and impact fees, suggests that the political branches cannot be
trusted to pursue equitable and efficient exaction policies, and that mu-
nicipal decisions should be subjected to constitutional or other legal
scrutiny.
In her thoughtful and provocative article,'22 Professor Been sug-
gests that these concerns are misplaced-that even if local polticians
had an instinct to misbehave, market forces would constrain their be-
tutes exist for particular communities, "the failure to reach the optimal preference position and
the substitution of a lower position becomes a matter of degree." Tiebout, 64 J. Pol. Econ. at 421
(cited in note 19).
120. 'hese questions are far from new. In the nineteenth century, similar questions arose in
connection with special assessments. See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of
Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth Century America, 12 J. Legal Stud. 201
(1983).
121. But compare Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1614, n.63
(1988) (suggesting that the Nollan doctrine might point toward greater constitutionalization of tax
law).
122. See Been, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (cited in note 10).
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havior, making legal intervention unnecessary. Professor Been is right
to criticize those whose analysis of exactions did not take competition
into account-much as Tiebout was right to criticize Samuelson and
Musgrave for failure to take competition between municipalities into
account. Been is also right that vigorous competition among municipali-
ties will constrain municipal power to collect exactions that would dis-
tort housing and commercial construction markets.
Unfortunately, however, competition will provide only limited pro-
tection against municipal abuse. Even vigorous competition provides
virtually no protection against the municipal extraction of economic
rents from landowners. Moreover, when competition is imperfect, mu-
nicipalities retain economic power to collect exactions that would dis-
tort the housing and commercial construction markets. Finally,
municipalities might adopt confiscatory exaction policies not to collect
revenue, but to insulate themselves against new or unwanted
development.
These cautions do not diminish the value of Professor Been's im-
pressive contribution, nor do they require federal constraints on munic-
ipal exaction policy. First, as Professor Been notes, even if the chance
to "exit" is not adequate to protect landowners against municipal
abuse, "voice"-the opportunity to participate in political
processes-may be sufficient.1 23 Moreover, to the extent that abusive
local exaction policies are directed against outsiders, state law con-
straints on municipal authority to collect exactions might well suffice to
curb any abuses. Alternatively, one might conclude that the difficulty of
establishing standards to govern municipal behavior make it appropri-
ate to tolerate "extortionate" exactions. But whatever policy response
one supports, the basic point remains: competition alone will not pre-
vent municipalities from imposing exactions that significantly exceed
the external costs imposed by new development.
123. Id. at 477.
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